'Chinese Nationalist Party Essay\r'

'On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong, curber of the Chinese communistic c solelyer decl ared triumph oer the jingoistic society (Guomindang) and brought an completion to four brutally long days of civilised fend for. The communistic conquest in the genteel state of contend has withal, created signifi scarcelytt contestation among historians, namely: was a commie conquest inevit adequate to(p) and if so is it more tender to see the Chinese civil struggle as a communist victory or as a Nationalist chastise?When researching these questions it becomes blatantly obvious that the Guomindang administration led by Chiang Kai-Shek was riddled with problems and they are truly practically time the ca recitation of their hold d possessfall.\r\nWide sprinkle presidency activity turpitude, spiraling pompousness, prejudice of public trustingness and intractable meagerness are bonny a hardly a(prenominal) of the failings the Guomindang afflicted upon the Chinese pack. These monumental failings go for a Communist victory seem al around inevitable, in that they just happened to be there to assume power as the Nationalists lost hurt and dr causeed in their own mistakes. In this sense it is more sensible to stunnedlook the Civil state of war as a Nationalist sweep over, rather than a Communist victory.\r\nOn the different hand, the Communists were able to second dismal countrified penury and the Nipp onenessse invasion into as destinys, using them to urge villagers that radical diverge was imperative and that the Communist Party was best qualified to take up nearly this change. Seen in this light, superior schema and faceal methods allowed the Communists to achieve victory and non just â€Å"move into a vacuum” as suggested by Barnett (Barnett, 1965: 1).\r\nThere is certainly an ingredient of inevitability with regard to the Communist victory, besides, in this essay I will manage that non just now was the outcome of the Chinese Civil fight non preordained, solely I will in addition critically evaluate the reasons the Guomindang lost the Civil War and explain that given their insurance policy mistakes, the Civil War should be seen as a Nationalist defeat rather than a Communist victory. If the Nationalists had been unstrained to adapt and had they initiated round changes in their st evaluategies, the Communist Party, no egress what its internal organisation or outside(a) st arraygies, would not realise been able to direct revolution to mainland China.\r\nThis theory is not endure by Kubek, who argues that the cause of the Nationalist defeat was due to a lack of precaution from the United States, declaring â€Å"sovietisation of China and Manchuria could be the manifestly logical outcome of post-war United States policy in China” (Kubek, 1965: 62). This view time period is unduly simplistic and overvalues America’s role in China, an opinion support by Chang, who trusts the Guomindang government’s â€Å" unsuccessful person was due not so frequently to lack of American support, still to its constitutive(a) stains” (Chang, 1965: 40).\r\nBefore analysing these inhe affiance defects and the reasons that the Nationalist Party lost the Civil War, it is important to discover the fundamentals of the home in China at the end of World War Two; specifically the consequences of the eight course war with Japan that totally exhausted the Guomindang militarily, scotchally and spiritually. Hsu argues that the war with Japan is the â€Å" individual(a) well-nigh important cause for the nightfall of the Nationalists” and â€Å"had there been no Japanese war, the stain in China would stir been very diffe subscribe” (Hsu, 1990: 734). Many of the Guomindang’s problems such(prenominal) as factionalism, subversion and head for the hills were ordinary prior to the Sino-Japanese War; however it was during the e xit phases of the Sino-Japanese War that these problems reached crisis proportions and in hindsight it seems impossible that the Guomindang could have overcome these problems to defeat the Communists (Service, 1965: 29).\r\nChang in addition believes that the Guomindang go about insurmountable problems prior to the Civil War, stating that â€Å"the government of Chiang Kai-Shek was built on quicksand and clay. How can it plunk for? Is it any wonder that it fell give care a house of cards when it had to spirit the Communist crisis?” (Chang, C. 1965: 41).\r\nWestad, (2003: 7) however argues that â€Å"in nastiness of the Guomindang’s weaknesses, the outcome of the post-war conflict with the Communists was no way predetermined in 1945”. At the end of the Sino-Japanese War the Guomindang held significant advantages over the Communists, with its widely recognised legitimate government controlling China, giving it the power to assess and conscript. On the other hand, the Communists could not crack the Guomindang’s soldiers in cost of training and equipment and could be â€Å"outgunned and outmanoeuvred in all major regions of the country” (Westad, 2003: 8).\r\nFurthermore, the Communist ships company was hardly represented in the cities at all, which of course was the power base of the Guomindang. However, the Communists also had successes ensueing from the war with Japan including increasing their field of crowd of control and practiced evolving their strategies of protracted insurrectionist war far-offe a additionst the Japanese which in turn generated public support. scorn this the company’s main forces were still located in North-west China and they were not in such a powerful plaza that a civil war with the Guomindang would be a mere formality in securing control of the country.\r\nThe Civil War is whence simply not a chemise of the imminent decline of the Guomindang and the Communists’ irresist ible rise. quite the Sino-Japanese War digestd the framework for the decisions and strategies that would ultimately lead to Nationalist defeat. The war with Japan left hand the Guomindang decimated and they did need to undergo reform in order to survive; however the factionalism and corruption within the Guomindang resulted in increasingly restrictive controls being utilise upon the war outwear Chinese pile. At a time when new strategies were needed, the government instead act its repressive controls and when war again bust out, the government lost even more support and collapsed with cataclysmic speed.\r\nThis was due in no small part to the leaders of the Guomindang, whose perpetuation of their own power henpecked over all other considerations (Service, 1965: 28). The confidence and mismanagement of the Guomindang alienated the Chinese throng and caused a loss of public confidence and respect. This loss of respect not tho resulted in the Nationalists losing influence in their own power bases, but made it easier for the Communists to use this public disharmony and encourage the Chinese people to think that a change in administration would bring about a change in their fortunes.\r\nAn object lesson of the Guomindang’s worthless leadership strategies can be seen in their occupation of power Japanese colonies (Service, 1965: 29). The Chinese citizens within these Japanese set-aside(p) territories had waited eight years for the repay of Nationalist rule, but instead of being treated as victims of war, they were functioned. The Guomindang leaders did not return their land but acquired it as their own property; moreover, they virtually eliminated the monetary assets of these people. This was caused by the currency in the occupied territories going through extreme inflation as the government only offered the unconscionable exchange rate of two blow to one; when a more apt rate would have been half that much (Phillips, 1996: 158). Furth ermore, the puppet leaders that had been installed by the Japanese often kept their positions or became members of the Guomindang. low-down policy decisions such as this would lead to the downfall of the Guomindang, as it is impossible to stir an telling war without the support of the people and the stintingal policies of the government alienated millions of agony people.\r\nThe Guomindang’s economic problems were not express to the territories formerly occupied by the Japanese. exclusively over China inflation was an exceptionally large problem, for as the increases seen during the Japanese War were allowed to spiral out of control during the Civil War. Service, (1965: 29) argues that this is a direct result of corruption within the Guomindang, and that they refused to take any effective steps to check inflation or implement agricultural reforms for fear of losing the support of the landlord class in China. In view of this, the Guomindang developed urban industry at the expense of agricultural and financed this by simply printing more bank notes.\r\nTheir economic mismanagement was disastrous for the majority of the Chinese people and meant that by 1948 government disbursement had become thirty times big when compared to its pre-war level; the budget deficit had also blown out to thirty times it pre-war level and inflation was increasing at the rate of thirty per cent a month (Chang, K. 1965: 23). The Nationalist government face up imminent fiscal doom and the Chinese people were becoming aware of the selfish nature of their government whose economic policies and financial mismanagement destroyed the livelihood of hundreds of millions of Chinese. The failings of the Guomindang would provide the Communist party with vitamin Ale opportunities to exploit the discontent of the Chinese people.\r\nThis was one of the reasons for the Communist victory in that they were able to gain the support of people from the rural areas who the Guomindang had alienated. An standard of this can be seen in the rural land reforms implemented in saucily gained territories. In these areas the Communists promoted production and ensured supplies by creating a self-sufficient economy. To rouse the productive inspiration of the small frys, they launched a c axerophtholaign to reduce rent and interest. Peasant associations and other organisations were urged to demand and utilize a 25 percent rent reduction, with a rent ceiling set at 37.5 percent of the crops. The interest rate on loans was limited to 1.5 percent a month, or 18 percent a year, much lower that the excessive rate formerly charged by the landlords (Westad, 2003: 11 and Fielding, 1999: 134). They were able to achieve these reforms without confiscating large amounts of land, as considerable redistribution of land to the peasants was accomplished by imposing graduated taxes in such a way that larger landholders voluntarily sold land because it was no drawn-out profitable.\r\nIt is arguable that the Communists had no intention of eliminating the economic power of the landlords, but instead they showed the peasants that they could physical exertion their power locally and play an alive(p) role in the war against a government that some had come to despise. The Communists gave the peasants what they cute: an army of friendly multitude who not only did not steal their crops but helped them bring in the harvest and who implemented popular but gradual economic reforms (Ebrey, 1996: 289). This is in stark contrast to the Guomindang who did not understand the peasants and showed no interest in aiding them. They failed to see the revolutionary potential of the peasant masses and unlike the Communist Party never attempted to organise them. This feature was best summarised by Hsu: â€Å"the stone that one builder had rejected became the cornerstone of the other’s house” (Hsu, 1990: 738).\r\nHowever, many of the most important cause of the Nationalist d efeat during the Civil War were host ones. patronage emerging from the Japanese War break in equipped and trained, the Nationalist Army was a tired force (Hsu, 1990: 734). This war-weariness was felt end-to-end China and there was widespread citation that full scale civil war would be a tragedy for the country. It is therefore, not surprising that the Guomindang’s persistence in war machine aggression towards the Communists, who were Chinese after(prenominal) all, failed to arouse the same patriotic committal as when the enemies were Japanese (Stuart, 1965: 19). Given this postal service the Nationalist Army needed sizeable leadership and to gain the support of the people; they were unsuccessful on both counts.\r\nThis was for the most part due to the leadership system created by Chiang Kai-Shek that was â€Å"a congerie of conservative political cliques” have-to doe with primarily with maintaining their own power (Service, 1965: 30). Furthermore, the highes t forces posts were reserved for those who like Chiang Kai-Shek had graduated from the Wh adenineoa military academy and this often meant that more keen officers were turned away. General Barr of the United States verbalise of the Guomindang leadership in 1949 that, â€Å"their military debacles in my opinion can all be attributed to the world’s worst leadership and many other morale destroying factors that lead to a complete loss of will to fight” (Barr, 1949: x quoted in Bianco, 1971: 180).\r\nIn fact, many battles were lost by the Nationalists without a fight, as hundreds of thousands of troops simply defected or surrendered to the Communists (Barnett, 1965: 5). An extype Ale of this may be seen during the Huai-Huai Campaign, where poor military leadership caused the Nationalist troops to become surrounded and resulted in an irreparable loss of manpower without a fight (Phillips, 1996: 158). Rather than undertaking offensives to seek out and destroy the main mobi le second units of the Communists, they holed up for the most part in isolated, vulnerable, defensive positions allowing the Communists to concentrate their forces and attack and master Nationalists’ positions one by one (Barnett, 1965: 5).\r\nThis schema played into the hands of the Communists whose primary last was to reduce the numbers of the Nationalist army. They were not concerned with holding specific geographical areas and this allowed them to be a lot more flexible in their attacks. Moreover, the Communist troops were ordered to avoid large battles and to function the enemy only when there was a high probability of victory. Mao Zedong argued that the only way guerrilla warfare could attend is if the army had the support of the people, and the Communists certainly had this (Mao Zedong, 1940: x cited in Bianco, 1971: 184).\r\nThe Communists successfully achieved this through the use of propaganda. They portrayed themselves as defenders of the nation and the Guom indang as enemies of all levels of society, from peasant to scholar (Chang, C. 1965: 40). Chiang Kai-shek himself admitted that the Nationalists adversity in propaganda â€Å"was a major defect in our struggle against Communism” (Kai-shek, 1965: 77).\r\nDespite this, the Nationalist army had many opportunities to bad weaken the Communists. However, their leadership too often committed crucial tactical mistakes, which were the result of lack of communication and disputes within the party caused by the factionalism that riddled the Guomindang leadership (Westad, 2003: 11). coterie politics and factionalism would eventually lead to the situation where unified action to either sack the problems in Nationalist held territory or to fight against the Communists became virtually impossible (Barnett, 1965: 6). This is in stark contrast to the leadership of the Communist armies, whose generals were not concerned with personal gain, but instead co-operated with each other and gained the support of the Chinese people and worked towards a join goal (Westad, 2003: 9).\r\nThese superior military manoeuvre and aforementioned economic reforms brought the Communists wide spread support and ultimately victory. However, this victory would never have been achievable were it not for the military, economic and social failings of the Guomindang. Chiang Kai-Shek himself admitted major defects in organisation and technique in the Nationalists’ war against Communism, however he argued that these defects were remediable, â€Å"so long as our strategy and policy were correct, I believe we still could have won” (Kai-Shek, 1965: 82). It is in this light that the Chinese Civil War should be viewed not as a Communist victory, but as a Nationalist defeat.\r\nThere is no disbelieve that the war against Japan was a crushing blow to the Nationalists economic and military power, however it was not fatal. The Nationalist government could have continued to consolidate it s power and office by the sheer weight of its military strength and financial resources (Tsou, 1965: 28). Even though the Nationalist government was far from popular, it was the most powerful military and economic force in China and could have survived if it had been willing to regain the support of the people. Defeat to the Communists was therefore, far from inevitable, and the Nationalists were very much the engineers of their own demise.\r\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\r\nBarnett, A. (1965), ‘ twofold factors’, in Pichon Loh (ed.) ‘The Kuomintang trouncing of 1949: seduction or give out?’ D.C. heathland & Company, BostonBianco, Lucien. (1971), ‘Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949’ Stanford University Press, StanfordChang, Carsun. (1965), ‘Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang dictatorship’, in PichonLoh (ed.) ‘The Kuomintang lashing of 1949: advantage or Collapse?’ D.C. heath& Company, BostonChang, Kia-Ngua. (1965) ‘War and Inflation’ in Pichon Loh (ed.) ‘The Kuomintang mass murder of 1949: achievement or Collapse?’ D.C. heathland & Company, BostonEbrey, Patricia. (1996), Cambridge Illustrated History: China, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, EnglandFielding, Mark & Morcombe, Margot. (1999), ‘The Spirit of Change †China in Revolution’ McGraw Hill Book Company, Roseville, NSWHsu, Immanuel C.Y. (1990), ‘The testify of Modern China’ Oxford University Press, New YorkKai-shek, Chiang 1965, ‘Communist designs and Kuomintang blunders’, inPichon Loh (ed.) The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse?, D.C.\r\nHeath & Company, BostonKubek, Anthony 1965, ‘Communist subversion and American appeasement’, inPichon Loh (ed.) The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse?, D.C.\r\nHeath & Company, BostonPhillips, Richard. (1996) ‘China since 1911’ St Martin’s Press, N ew York.\r\nService, tin S. 1965, ‘The enthronement of reaction’, in Pichon Loh (ed.)The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse?, D.C. Heath & Company,BostonStuart, John L. (1965), ‘Popular dissatisfy and Creeping Paralysis’, in Pichon Loh (ed.)The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or\r\nCollapse?, D.C. Heath & Company,BostonTsou, Tang 1965, ‘Contradictions between program and practise’, in PichonLoh (ed.) The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse?, D.C. Heath& Company, BostonWestad, Odd Arne 2003, Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War 1946 -1950, Stanford University Press, California\r\n'